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which this education moved, the author is both sympathetic towards it and appreciative of its great merits: its national color, its insistence upon balance and moderation, its attempt in both mental and physical spheres to attain sound health instead of special capacity for special feats, its love of "nurture" as opposed to mere "instruction" and, above all, its firm conviction that the goal of true education is the formation of civic character.

Finally, Dr. Bosanquet estimates truly, and states lucidly, Plato's real attitude towards the education of his time, as far as it is expressed in the first four books of the "Republic." He points out (what the modern critic too often forgets) that Plato does not condemn that system as such but, on the contrary, warmly approves of it. Plato pleads only (1) that the underlying principles should be made manifest; (2) that each item should be consciously referred back to them—a condition which involves several alterations in detail, but only in detail. These principles are of eternal value; they may be seen in application to-day in every refined English-speaking household. But Dr. Bosanquet wisely deprecates any attempt to "place" Plato. Our duty is not to label him with some party catchword, but rather "to learn his great ideas sympathetically and trust our own sense for their application." The difficulty, without question, as well as the value, lies in the application. Yet the modern reader will heartily agree with the conclusion that, "it is worth thinking of, how far in education the idea of the growth of a mind can be made the central point, so that the things which are considered worth teaching may really have time to sink into and to nourish the whole human being, morally and intellectually alike. In as far as this problem is solved we shall attain a higher result than was attained by the Greeks in proportion as our resources for appealing to human nature are more varied and profound than theirs."

W. H. FAIRBROTHER.

LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD.

A HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By H. Höffding, translated from the German by B. E. Meyer. Two Vols. Pp. xvii., 532; ix., 600. London: Macmillan & Co., 1900.

It is, to the present reviewer at least, a great temptation to dismiss the work before him with the single remark that Professor Höffding has written quite the best, if not the only really worthy History of Philosophy that modern times have produced. A com-

parison of even the most satisfactory of the previous works on the subject will at once suggest to an inquiring mind what a History of Modern Philosophy ought *not* to be. Some of the very best suffer from the inevitable tendency of the historian, who is also a philosopher with theories of his own to recommend, to treat the course of previous speculation as a mere prelude to the appearance of a final or absolute system of truth; some, like the otherwise excellent manual of Schwegler, are planned on an unduly limited scale; nearly all take the form of handbooks for the student who needs for university purposes a neatly tabulated account of systems and doctrines, rather than that of a continuous history of European thought addressed to the cultivated public at large; finally, one and all mutilate and misrepresent their subject by treating the development of speculative thought in abstraction from that simultaneous development of physical science which has at every stage reacted upon and largely determined the course of metaphysical construction. Prof. Höffding has, for the first time, produced a History which is singularly free from all these grave defects. His work is, to begin with, a sympathetic and thoroughly "objective" narrative which abstains from the futile attempt to read the ideas of any single system into the facts of history. Not that he is without definite views of his own or that those views do not occasionally make themselves felt in the course of the exposition, but he possesses in an eminent degree the true historian's power of entering into the thoughts of other ages and surveying their problems from their own standpoint in a way that enables him to do reasonable justice alike to Descartes and Locke, to Fichte and to Mill. The scale upon which his task has been executed again has made it possible to bestow adequate treatment upon many interesting thinkers who are commonly dismissed in the manuals with the mere assignment of a couple of dates and a line or two of, frequently inaccurate, summarization. In particular, the interesting series of Italian Renaissance philosophers whose labors prepared the way for the more reasoned out constructions of the seventeenth century are probably for the first time restored to their real significance for philosophical history. The account of Bruno, for instance, is by far and away the best and fullest description of that singularly felicitous and acute, though unsystematic, thinker, accessible to the English reader. The avoidance of the over-systematizing and tabulatory style of the ordinary manual is another feature of Prof. Höffding's work

which calls for the highest commendation. At last we have a History of Philosophy which fairly meets the demands which would be addressed to a historian of Art or Science or Political Theory; I mean, a History from which the reader of general culture who wishes to know what the main lines of development in the particular branch of human thought under investigation have been, as distinguished from the student who wants dates and tables for examination uses, may get what he comes for. But the greatest merit of the book, to the mind of the present writer at least, is the constant care that has been taken to exhibit the way in which the great ideas of mechanical and biological science have influenced the course of metaphysical thought. It is mainly because this connection has been neglected by previous historians of the subject that the development of metaphysics has too often appeared to hang in the air and to be quite out of relation to the line of really fruitful and vital scientific progress. Prof. Höffding strikes the right note in this respect from the very first. He has rightly seen, for instance, that no history of philosophical thought in the seventeenth century can set the facts in their true proportions unless the growth and development of the mechanical view of nature from Galileo to Newton is made the central point of the narrative. In restoring Galileo in particular to his rightful place as the real founder both of the mechanical theory and of the true mathematico-experimental method of interrogating nature he has not only corrected a grave injustice, but has for the first time put the development of seventeenth-century thought in its true light. From Hobbes and Descartes to Leibnitz and Newton the whole movement of thought centres round the ideas and methods of the "Dialogues on the New Sciences," and yet historians like Ueberweg and Windelband have not thought the founder of dynamics worth more than a fraction of the space they have devoted to the theosophic fancies of Jacob Boehme! The note rightly struck in the careful treatment bestowed upon Kepler and Galileo is maintained throughout Professor Höffding's narrative. He has properly treated the mechanical physics of Descartes' "Principia" as of little less importance for the history of thought than the metaphysics of the "Meditations," and his account of the philosophical consequences of Darwinism and of the doctrine of the conservation of energy (the two really great scientific ideas of our own century) in contemporary thinking is a model of lucid exposition. I do not know whether I shall equally express the opin-

ion of all readers if I go on to say that a second almost equally striking proof of the author's sense of historical proportion is afforded by his treatment of the Post-Kantian German Idealism. But to my own mind at least the real course of philosophic history has always appeared to be woefully distorted in the current works on the subject by the undue importance attached to the Hegelian system. The notion is far too prevalent, in England at least, that there is but one legitimate line of development from Kant, and that the line which culminated in the "absolute" Idealism. In Prof. Höffding's narrative the facts fortunately appear in a truer light. Hegel finds his real place by the side of Schopenhauer as a representative of one particular development of Kantian ideas, the "Romantic" philosophy, but the equal legitimacy of the descent of Herbart and Beneke and Fries from the sage of Königsberg is no less fully recognized. It is only when it is thus made clear that the thought of Kant is not exhausted by the movement to Hegel, that the real significance of the critical philosophy can be properly appreciated. Or to put the same thought in another way, Prof. Höffding's second volume will explain to the attentive reader why Hegel is dead or dying, but Kant a living force in the philosophic thought of to-day.

I have said that Prof. Höffding does not fail, as a philosopher of his eminence can hardly fail, to indicate his own intellectual preferences, though they are nowhere unduly obtruded. His openly expressed preference for the constructive thinkers of the seventeenth century over their successors of the eighteenth century will be readily understood, and probably shared, by readers in harmony with his own sympathetic attitude towards empirical psychology and exact physical science. The strongly sympathetic account of Mill and Spencer, which is also presumably indicative of personal leanings, is naturally interesting to English readers. In the case of Mill, Prof. Höffding shows himself fully alive to that eminent man's truly remarkable inconsistencies and contradictions, while explaining them, fairly enough, as largely due to the struggles of a singularly candid and open-minded nature to free itself from early prepossessions; in dealing with Spencer—and this is the only instance of serious bias that I can call to mind in the whole two volumes, personal admiration seems to have partially blinded the writer to the really wonderful mistiness and ambiguity which besets that philosopher's treatment of the cardinal terms of his own theory.

Of course there are bound to be a number of special points as to which any reader of a comprehensive "History of Philosophy" will differ from his author, but it scarcely seems worth while in a general notice like this to allude to such matters of mere detail. There is, however, one point which is more than a matter of detail and which I cannot pass over altogether in silence. Prof. Höffding tends too much, I think, to write as if the mechanical theory in its final elaboration at the hands of Newton were the last word of physical science as to the universe. He scarcely seems alive to the degree to which the elements of that theory still remain matters of hypothesis nor to the extent to which the hypotheses have been of late years subjected to criticism by a growing and important school of scientific thinkers. At least he seems to regard mechanism as being somehow more than a descriptive hypothesis, though how much more we are never told. We should like to know what is his attitude towards the tendency represented in physics by Mach and Kirchhoff, and in philosophy by Avenarius, but the limits imposed upon him by his choice of 1880 as the *terminus ad quem* of his "History" have perhaps prevented his gratifying our curiosity. Probably it is well that Prof. Höffding has drawn the line where he has done. There are signs that with the wonderful growth of experimental methods in Psychology, with the emphatic return of Nietzsche to individualism in ethics, and the widespread revolt already referred to against accepting mechanism as more than a partial description of phenomena in physics, we are standing on the threshold of a new philosophical era, which will produce a new intellectual synthesis along lines as yet undreamed of. It may be that it is yet too early to attempt taking stock of the philosophical position of the present. Meanwhile it is well that this much be understood; if with Prof. Höffding's luminous narrative before them our writers of popular scientific essays continue to repeat the parrot-cry that modern metaphysical thought has revolved without progress round the same circle of ideas, and that its speculations have stood out of relation to the concepts that have guided fruitful scientific advance, they will henceforth be without excuse. It should be added that the English version is idiomatic and usually accurate, though somewhat disfigured by the retention of German forms like *Frankfurt*, etc. In one place Descartes' patroness, Elizabeth of the Palatinate, is gravely called Elizabeth *von der Pfalz*, as though the translator had taken the last three words for a proper name. There are also

a few ugly misprints which point to careless proofreading, *e. g.*, "finite" cause for "final" cause (Vol. I., p. 231), "*there* (for their) *esse* is *percipi*" (*Ibid.* p. 420).

A. E. TAYLOR.

OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

EDUCATIONAL AIMS AND METHODS. Lectures and Addresses by Sir Joshua Fitch, M. A., LL. D. Cambridge University Press. 1900.

The title of this book scarcely conveys a correct or adequate idea of its contents. A book bearing the name "Educational Aims and Methods" is apt to raise expectation of systematic and critical treatment of the aims of education, followed by a discussion of the methods whereby these may best be attained. The student who is acquainted with the German Literature on the subject would also probably expect to find in a book of this description copious references to the sciences of Psychology and Ethics which are rightly held to supply education with some of its main principles. The purpose of the present book, however, is far simpler and less ambitious. The author's statement in the Preface that "the lectures and addresses collected in this volume have been given at various times within the last few years before academic audiences in England or America" is a sufficient explanation of the absence of systematic and continuous treatment. The lectures have for their subjects some question bearing on the general aims and method of education, or the life and policy of some educational reformer or some interesting phase of the administration of education.

In spite of the title, the aims of education are nowhere explicitly defined or synthesized. This omission, however, one scarcely regrets; for in indirect ways and by gradual accretions a lofty and cumulative conception of the purpose of education is gradually formed in the reader's mind. Equally satisfactory in our opinion is the author's exposition of general method. "We are safe in taking for certain this one truth, that human character whether we look at it from its ethical or from its intellectual side is the result of growth and not of manufacture. It is a living organism, and not a highly delicate and curious machine." It may, indeed, be said that the chief merit of the lectures on general method lies in the impressiveness and cogency with which from ever-varying standpoints the organic character of true instruction is demon-